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Competitive Supragovernmental Regulation:
How Could It Be Democratic?*
Errol Meidinger**
I. INTRODUCTION
This Article explores the possibility that an emerging mode of transnational
governance may also be generating a novel form of democracy, one in which
competing regulatory programs aim to anticipate emergent public values and
institute regulatory mechanisms to implement them, thereby advancing their
own authority.' "Competitive supragovernmental regulation" is largely driven
and implemented by nonstate actors, and is therefore commonly viewed as
suffering a democracy deficit. However, it institutionalizes broad participation,
rigorous deliberative procedures, responsiveness to state law, incorporation of
widely accepted norms, and competition among regulatory programs to achieve
effective implementation and widespread public acceptance.
This Article was initially prepared for the session on "New Governance and Its Critics," Joint
Meetings of the Law & Society Association, the Research Committee on the Sociology of Law, et
al., Berlin, July 26, 2007. I am grateful for comments on presentations at the Center for
Independent Social Research, St. Petersburg (Sept 2006), the Yale Conference on Corporate
Social Responsibility (an 2007), the UC Berkeley Center for the Study of Law and Society (Apr
2007), and the SUNY-Buffalo Law Faculty Workshop (Nov 2007), as well as for individual
comments by Fred Gale, James Gardner, Bronwen Morgan, Ken Shockley, and the editors of this
journal. I also thank the Baldy Center for Law and Social Policy, the Dean of the Law School at
SUNY-Buffalo, and particularly the Environmental and Natural Resources Law Program at Lewis
and Clark Law School for supporting this research.
Professor and Vice Dean of Law for Research, State University of New York at Buffalo.
Honorary Professor of Forestry and Environmental Science, University of Freiburg, Germany.
Distinguished Environmental Law Scholar, Lewis and Clark Law School, Portland, OR,
2006-2007.
Alvin Toffler appears to have coined the term "anticipatory democracy" three decades ago.
Toffler was advocating the injection of enhanced "future consciousness" and public participation
into traditional state-based processes. Alvin Toffler, What is Anicipatogy Democracy?, 9 Futurist 224
(1975). As visionary as he may have been, there is little inkling in his work of the kinds of self-
organizing supragovemmental regulatory systems described in this Article.
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The purpose of this Article is to work through an initial assessment of the
democratic potential of competitive supragovernmental regulatory systems.
Section II lays out the main institutional elements of competitive
supragovernmental regulation and gives some examples of its operation. Key
features include implementation through market chains, increasingly
participatory and transparent deliberative procedures, and competition among
programs. Section III then focuses on the democratic dimensions of competitive
supragovernmental regulatory systems. In partial contrast to other work
important in the field,2 it takes a systemic view, examining the composite
democratic potential of regulatory systems composed of multiple programs,3
rather than focusing on individual programs. It argues that competing programs
significantly shape each other's policies, creating an overall tendency toward
increased democratization. For example, leading programs that practice
increasingly sophisticated forms of deliberative and representative democracy are
slowly pushing lagging programs in the same directions, thus creating system-
wide democratic tendencies. Section III also argues that competition among
programs places them under steady incentives to develop standards and
implementation mechanisms that will both operate effectively and achieve
widespread acceptance, thereby instituting a form of democratic
experimentalism.4 Section IV concludes by first summarizing the democratic
case for competitive supragovernmental regulation and then discussing some of
its primary weaknesses. One of its key conclusions is that we presently do not
know enough about the dynamics of competition among programs to be
confident that they indeed result in regulatory standards that reflect and
2 See, for example, Steven Bernstein and Benjamin Cashore, Can Non-state Global Governance Be
Legitimate? An Analytical Framework, 1 Reg & Governance 347 (2007); Chris Tollefson, Fred Gale,
and David Haley, Setting the Standard: Certification, Governance and the Forest Stewardship Council (British
Columbia forthcoming 2008).
3 The term "program" is used in this Article to refer to alliances of organizations engaged in
developing and implementing regulatory policies through coordinated institutional arrangements.
Although use of the term may seem repetitive in places, this is necessary for precision.
Supragovernmental regulatory programs are larger than organizations and smaller and more
directed than networks. Competing programs often engage in building, extending, and
strengthening networks in which they are mutually involved. Although programs are sometimes
called "schemes" (see, for example, Ruth Nussbaum and Markku Simula, The Forest Certification
Handbook 15 (Earthscan 2005)), the term is not a good descriptor because programs are more
adaptive and generative than it suggests. Programs are also distinct from agencies because they are
not arms of states and from bureaucracies because power in them is relatively distributed and
non-hierarchical.
4 See Michael C. Dorf and Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism, 98 Colum L
Rev 267, 314 (1998). See generally Charles F. Sabel and Jonathan Zeidin, Learning from Difference:
The New Architecture of Experimentalist Governance in the European Union, European Governance, Paper
No C-07-02 (May 10, 2007), available online at <http://www.connex-network.org/eurogov/pdf/
egp-connex-C-07-02.pdf > (visited Nov 17, 2007).
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anticipate broader public values. Therefore we need to learn much more about
what factors determine the outcomes of supragovernmental regulatory
competitions. It may then be possible to revise the rules governing that
competition to more fully realize its democratic potential.
II. COMPETITIVE SUPRAGOVERNMENTAL REGULATION
Regulatory programs that are developed and implemented primarily by
nonstate organizations have grown rapidly over the past decade. Considerable
scholarship has examined the Forest Stewardship Council,' Fairtrade Labelling
Organizations International,6 International Federation of Organic Agriculture
Movements,7 Marine Stewardship Council,8 and others.9 While they vary in many
particulars, these programs share the following general characteristics:
Supragovernmentafiy. These regulatory programs are established primarily by
nonstate actors organized in transnational networks. While they often have
5 See, for example, Benjamin Cashore, Graeme Auld, and Deanna Newsom, Governing Through
Markets: Forest Cerfification and the Emergence of Non-state Authoiy 5 (Yale 2004); Chris Elliott, Forest
Certification: A Polig Network Perspective (Ctr Intl Forestry Research 2000); Fred Gale, The Tropical
Timber Trade Regime (St Martins 1998); David Humphreys, Logiam: Deforestation and the Crisis of
Global Governance (Earthscan 2006); Errol Meidinger, Human Rights, Private' Environmental Regulation,
and Community, 6 Buff Env L J 123 (1999); Errol Meidinger, Chris Elliott, and Gerhard Oesten,
eds, Social and Political Dimensions of Forest Certification (Forstbuch 2003).
6 See, for example, Sasha Courville, Social Accountabiliy Audits: Challenging or Defending Democratic
Governance?, 25 L & Poly 269 (2003); Margaret Levi and April Linton, Fair Trade: A Cup at a Time?
31 Pol & Socy 407 (2003); Daniel Jaffee, Brewing Justice: Fair Trade Coffee, Sustainabilio, and Survival
(California 2007).
7 See, for example, William D. Coleman and Austina J. Reed, Legalisation, Transnalionalism and the
Global Organic Movement, in Christian Briitsch and Dirk Lehmkuhl, eds, Law and Legalization in
Transnational Relations 101, 113-17 (Routledge 2007); Johannes Michelsen, Organic Farning in
Regulatory Perspective: The Danish Case, 41 Sociologia Ruralis 62 (2001).
o See, for example, Lars H. Gulbrandsen, Mark of Sustainabilioy? Challenges for Fishery and Forestry Eco-
labeling, 47 Envir 8 (2005); Alexia Cummins, The Marine Stewardship Council. A Multi-Stakeholder
Approach to Sustainable Fishing, 11 Corp Soc Resp & Envir Mgmt 85 (2004).
9 Additional sectors with significant supragovernmental regulatory programs include apparel,
ecotourism, mining, and green building construction. See, for example, Tim Bartley, Certifying
Forests and Factories: States, Social Movements, and the Rise of Private Regulation in the Apparel and Forest
Products Fields, 31 Pol & Socy 433 (2003); Hevina S. Dashwood, Canadian Mining Companies and
Coeporate Social Responsibili: Weighing the Impact of Global Norms, 40 Can J Pol Sci 129 (2007);
Cynthia A. Williams, Civil Society Initiatives and "Soft Law" in the Oil and Gas Industry, 36 NYU J Intl
L & Pol 457, 461 (2004); J.F. McLennan and P. Rumsey, Is LEED the Holy Grail of Sustainable
Design?, 6 Envir Design & Constr 34 (2003); Martha Honey, Ecotounism & Certification: Setting
Standards in Practice 39 (Island 2002). More generally, see Kenneth W. Abbott and Duncan Snidal,
The Governance Triangle: Regulatory Standards Institutions and the Shadow of the State (Oct 2006) (draft on
file with author); Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, Activists Beyond Borders: Advocag Networks in
International Politics 19 (Cornell 1998); Ann Florini, ed, The Third Force: The Rise of Transnational Civil
Society 24 (Carnegie Endow 2000).
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origins in both activist groups and businesses or trade associations,"0 the activist
groups typically provide the primary motivating force by both challenging the
acceptability of existing institutional arrangements and offering alternatives.
Governments are present in the regulatory fields, but tend to play minor roles in
the primary negotiation and institutionalization processes, as is discussed in
more detail in the section on "interactions with states" below.
Supply Chain Leveraging. Most supragovernmental regulatory programs are
leveraged into place and maintained by pressuring sensitive and powerful points
in transnational supply chains. Usually these are major branded retailers (for
example, Home Depot), but they may also be important wholesalers or
producers (for example, DeBeers)." The fact that the supply chains are
transnational networks generates complex regulatory dynamics, including a
compounded form of legal pluralism-both state/state and
state/supragovernmental; hence applicable regulatory standards are particularly
subject to debate and rapid change.
Use of Conventional Institutional Modalities. Supragovernmental regulatory
programs generally draw upon and mimic institutional practices already tested
and legitimated in less controversial regulatory processes, 12 such as setting
standards to achieve interoperability or reliability of products. 3 These usually
involve four institutional elements:
(1) Setting standards for appropriate practices. This is typically done by
committees that are both expert- and stakeholder-based.
10 Dashwood, 40 Can J Pol Sci at 152 (cited in note 9).
11 See Erika Sasser, Gaining Leverage: NGO Influence on Certification Institutions in the Forest Products Sector,
in Lawrence W. Teeter, Benjamin Cashore, and Dao Zhang, eds, Forest Pokly for Private Forestry
222, 236-37 (CABI 2003); Virginia Haufler, The Kimbery Process, Club Goods, and Public Enforcement
of a Private Regime, Paper prepared for the Voluntary Regulation Conference, University of
Washington at Seattle (June 29, 2007), available online at <http://www.polisci.washington.edu/
direct/facultybio/vrc/Haufler--Kimberly nc.doc> (visited Nov 17, 2007); Tim Bartley, Standards
for Sweatshops. The Power and Limits of Club Theory for Explaining Voluntary Labor Standards Programs, 2,
Paper prepared for the Voluntary Regulation Conference, University of Washington at Seattle
(June 29, 2007), available online at < http://www.polisci.washington.edu/direct/faculty_bio/vrc/
club%20theoryBartley.doc> (visited Nov 17, 2007).
12 David Szablowski, Of Models and Mimics: Legitimation Strategies and the Constitution of Transnational
LegalAuthoritv, Paper presented at the International Studies Association Conference, San Diego
(Mar 22-25, 2006) (draft on file with author).
13 See, for example, Ross E. Cheit, Setting Safey Standards: Regulation in the Public and Private Sectors
(California 1990); Samuel Krislov, How Nations Choose Product Standards and Standards Change Nations
(Pittsburgh 1997); Harm Schepel, The Constitution of Private Governance: Product Standards in the
Regulation of Integrating Markets 4-6 (Hart 2005). But see Stepan Wood, Environmental Management
Systems and Public Authori in Canada: Rethinking Environmental Governance, 10 Buff Envir L J 129
(2002) (arguing generally that defining standard setting as technical often obscures politically
important questions).
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(2) Cerifying that standards are met. This role is usually performed by
professionals who are organizationally independent of both the
standard setting organization and the company being evaluated.
(3) Accrediting certifiers. Accreditation is generally carried out by
specialized experts who are also organizationally distinct from the
standard setting organization.
(4) Labeling complying products or organizations. This involves rules for
labeling and systems for monitoring the "chain of custody" of
certified products.
Increasingly Partiipatoy and Transparent Dedsional Procedures. One of the most
striking developments in supragovernmental regulation has been the broad and
continuous expansion of participation and transparency, although both remain
subject to improvement. 14 Most programs now provide for multi-stakeholder
participation, notice and comment processes for rulemaking and adjudication,
public responses to comments and explanations of decisions, formalized dispute
resolution and appeals processes, publication of rules, procedures and decisions,
and similar practices characterizing modern administrative regulation. 5 Norms
for participation continue to intensify, so that, for example, the best practices
standards of the International Social and Environmental Accreditation and
Labelling Alliance require that "participation reflects a balance of interests
among interested parties' ' 16 and that "the standard-setting process shall strive for
consensus."'
17
14 Archon Fung, Deliberative Democragy and International Labor Standards, 16 Governance 51 (2003)
(noting serious problems with transparency in the field of international labor standards).
1s See generally Errol Meidinger, The Administrative Law of Global Private-Public Regulation: The Case of
Forestry, 17 Eur J Ind L 47 (2006); Errol Meidinger, Beyond Wesqphalia: Competitive Legalization in
Eneging Transnational Regulatogy Systems, in Christian Briitsch and Dirk Lehmkuhl, eds, Law and
Legalization in Transnational Relations 121 (Routledge 2007).
16 International Social and Environmental Accreditation and Labelling Alliance, Code of Good Practice,
7.1, available online at <http://www.isealalliance.org/document/docWindow.cfm?fuseaction=
document.viewDocument&documentid=212&documentFormadd=898> (visited Nov 17, 2007)
("ISEAL Code"). ISEAL is only one effort-albeit a particularly important one-to create
standards for supragovernmental regulatory organizations. See also Mary Kay Gugerty, Self-
regulation and Voluntay Programs among Nonprofit Oqganizations, Draft Chapter prepared for the
Voluntary Regulation Conference, University of Washington at Seattle (une 29, 2007), available
online at <http://www.polisci.washington.edu/direct/faculty-bio/vrc/Gugerty-VolPrograms
Nonprofits.pdf> (visited Nov 17, 2007) (providing a preliminary overview of this relatively
unstudied field).
17 ISEAL Code at 5.6 (cited in note 16). "Consensus" is defined as "[g]eneral agreement,
characterized by the absence of sustained opposition to substantial issues by any important part of
the concerned interests and by a process seeking to take into account the views of interested
parties, particularly those directly affected, and to reconcile any conflicting arguments. NOTE -
Consensus need not imply unanimity." Id at 3.1.
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Regulatoy Competition. Although research on supragovernmental regulation
tends to focus on individual organizations and their programs, most regulatory
domains are populated by more than one program. 8 A common scenario is that
the establishment of an NGO-sponsored program is countered by the
establishment of an industry-sponsored program (or several). Although the main
reason for founding the industry program may be to undermine the NGO
program, perhaps by creating confusion in the marketplace, the programs tend
to mutually survive. Not only do they compete, but in doing so they also
become somewhat dependent on each other. Section III argues that a reliable
assessment of the democratic implications of competitive supragovernmental
regulation requires a better understanding of the dynamics of this competition
and interdependence, but at present they are not well understood. There is
informal acknowledgement that competition plays a role in preserving respective
programs. 9 There is also some evidence for a "ratcheting up" of standards, at
least for the industry programs.2i Conversely, the NGO programs sometimes
find it advisable to loosen or modify standards to be more competitive and
feasible in the marketplace.2'
Thus, supragovernmental regulatory standards and practices are formed
not only by the official participants in the programs, but also by processes of
interprogram observation, competition, and mutual adjustment.
Supragovernmental regulation, then, should be understood as a dynamic,
competitive system, in which multiple regulators compete for business and
legitimacy. Although such processes of competition are commonly thought of as
subpolitical, Section III explores the possibility that they may actually be vehicles
of an emergent form of democratic politics.
18 See, for example, Abbott and Snidal, Governance Triangle at 5 (cited in note 9) (the authors provide
a highly suggestive overview in Figure 1 of their article).
19 One informant associated with an industry program explained the situation as follows: "There's
an old saying among lawyers that a town that isn't big enough to support one lawyer can support
two just fine." Interview 21016 (on file with author). Author's Note: some of the information
supporting the analysis in this Article is derived primarily from interviews or discussions with the
author in which the speakers had assurances of anonymity. These communications are preserved
in detailed contemporaneous notes on file with the author. [Editorial note: In order to
accommodate this anonymity, the Chicago Journal of International Law has made an exception to
its policy of independently reviewing all cited sources, instead relying on the author to ensure the
proper use of confidential interviews.]
20 See generally Archon Fung, Dara O'Rourke, and Charles Sabel, Can We Put an End to Sweatshops?
A New Democray Forum on Raising Global Labor Standards 87 (Beacon 2001); Christine Overdevest,
Codes of Conduct and Standard Setting in the Forest Sector- Constructing Markets for Democragy?, 59 Indust
Rel 172 (2004).
21 See, for example, Benjamin Cashore, Graeme Auld, and Deanna Newsom, The United States' Race
to Certi Sustainable Forestgy: Non-State Environmental Governance and the Competition for Poligy-Making
Authoriy, 5 Bus & Pol 219, 231-32 (2003).
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Interactions with States. While states usually are not prime movers, they play
significant roles in supragovernmental regulatory systems. Individual
certification programs generally define their policies in terms of existing state
regulatory frameworks and often consciously serve the purposes of states by
requiring, at a minimum, compliance with state law.2 2 Thus, certification by a
supragovernmental regulatory program often provides state regulators with a
useful proxy for state law compliance. Perhaps more interestingly, it is not
uncommon for states to seek supragovernmental certification of their own
management practices, as is increasingly the case with the forestry and fishery
programs.23 In addition, many states operate procurement programs that
establish preferences or requirements for products certified by
supragovernmental programs.
2 4
Important interactions also occur between state and supragovernmental
regulatory programs. State regulatory agencies sometimes find themselves in tacit
competition with supragovernmental programs. This may not be a problem in
regulatory domains where states are not active and can implicitly or explicitly
cede regulatory authority to the supragovernmental programs. Where state
agencies are active in the same domains, however, they will often feel some
pressure to adjust their policies in response to those of the supragovernmental
programs. Given the long interactions of many state regulatory programs with
industry, they may incline toward industry-based standards over NGO-based
ones. However, such choices are vulnerable to contestation and can easily
subject state agencies to fresh criticisms that they more easily avoided when they
were perceived as the only regulators in the domain.
Through this complex interaction, state standards are often drawn into
closer alignment with supragovernmental ones, although they often remain
different in significant ways. Sometimes convergence happens through formal
deliberative processes, particularly when governmental and supragovernmental
rulemaking occur in close proximity to each other. In such cases the same ideas,
and often the same actors, are involved in both processes; thus, much
22 There are some cases in which supragovernmental standards are inconsistent with state standards.
In Russia, for example, Forest Stewardship Council standards that require leaving some dead and
dying trees in the forest to provide wildlife habitats are inconsistent with state regulations
requiring complete removal. But such cases seem quite rare.
23 Errol Meidinger, Multi-Interest Self-Governance through Global Product Certification Programs, in Olaf
Dilling, Martin Herberg, and Gerd Winter, eds, Responsible Business? Self-Governance in Transnational
Economic Transactions (Hart forthcoming 2008).
24 Peter Sprang, et al, Public Procurement and Forest Certification: Assessment of the Implicaions for Poliy, Law
and International Trade, available online at <http://www.ecologic.de/download/briefe/2006/
933_brief-procurementjforest.pdf> (visited Nov 17, 2007).
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convergence can happen quite quickly.25 More often, the interchange is slower
and barely visible. Thus, regulatory officials gradually and almost imperceptibly
redefine their informal standards as professional and on-the-ground definitions
of "best practices" evolve. They may also adapt their enforcement and other
policies to privilege firms meeting supragovernmental standards. Revisions to
state standards may gradually come to appear quite natural as regulated
organizations adjust their practices to meet supragovernmental standards.
Supragovernmental standards may also be incorporated through other state
legal processes, as for example, when tort standards for due care assimilate
private standards. 26 Among the potentially most powerful state-based legal
mechanisms for incorporation is international trade law, which directs World
Trade Organization members engaging in "technical regulation" to adopt
supragovernmental international standards when they are available and would
not be inappropriate.27 This provision creates a sort of Holy Grail for
supragovernmental regulatory programs, which suddenly enjoy the possibility
that their standards could be leveraged into state requirements by WTO-
mandated incorporation. Although there is scant information on whether this
has happened on a widespread basis to date, many supragovernmental programs
seem to be motivated in part by the possibility of widespread state adoption.
Despite the tendencies toward convergence, however, there are also
incentives for continued differentiation. Regulatory programs and organizations
maintain themselves in part by claiming unique roles and special competencies.
To date, this has been the experience in the fields of forestry, organic agriculture,
25 Proximity of rulemaking processes leading to convergence in forest certification standards
occurred in Bolivia and Estonia. For Bolivia, see Johannes Ebeling, Market-Based Conservation and
Global Governance: Can Forest Certification Compensate for Poor Environmental Law Enforcement? Insights
from Ecuador and Bolivia Gune 2005) (unpublished master's thesis presented to the University of
Freiburg in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Magister Artium in Political
Science) (on file with author). For Estonia, see Rein Ahas, Hando Hain, and Peep Mardiste, Forest
Certification in Estonia, in Benjamin Cashore, et al, eds, Confronting Sustainabilioy: Forest Certification in
Developing and Transitioning Countries (Yale School of Forestry and Environmental Studies 2006).
26 Schepel, Constitution of Private Governance at 339 (cited in note 13). See also Errol Meidinger, Private
Environmental Certification Systems and US Environmental Law: Closer than You May Think, 31 Envir L
Rep 10162 (2000).
27 GATT Annex 1A, Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (1994), § 2.4, 33 ILM 154, available
online at <http://www.wto.org/english/docs-e/legaLe/17-tbt-e.htm> (visited Nov 17, 2007).
Where technical regulations are required and relevant international standards
exist or their completion is imminent, Members shall use them, or the relevant
parts of them, as a basis for their technical regulations except when [they] ...
would be an ineffective or inappropriate means for the fulfillment of the
legitimate objectives pursued, for instance because of fundamental climatic or
geographical factors or fundamental technological problems.
These international standards are typically developed in supragovemmental regulatory processes.
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and fair trade, each of which manifests the continued presence of plural
regulatory programs.28 How long this will continue is impossible to say. But
from a utilitarian standpoint, it is not a problem so long as the costs of
regulatory divergence and uncertainty are outweighed by the benefits of
regulatory competition and innovation. Moreover, continued competition may
also facilitate a more democratically responsive regulatory system.
In sum, "competitive supragovernmental regulation" characterizes a novel
and expanding mode of governance in which supragovernmental regulatory
programs develop competing standards and implementation mechanisms. The
standards are typically deployed through sensitive transnational commodity
chains using conventional institutional modalities and increasingly participatory
and transparent procedures. States and businesses participate in these processes
to varying degrees, but the prime movers are typically organizations set up for
the express purpose of developing standards for industries, often in the first
instance by nongovernmental organizations.
"Supragovernmental" denotes the hybrid and dynamically expansionary
nature of this governance mode. A given regulatory field is often centered on the
competition between supragovernmental programs. Figure 1 depicts the
emerging regulatory structure in the forestry sector as I see it. The Forest
Stewardship Council ("FSC")29 is the NGO-sponsored program, and the
Programme for Endorsement of Forest Certification ("PEFC")30 is the industry-
sponsored one. Although the arena centers on them, the participation and
engagement of businesses and states are necessary to make the regulatory
process work. While necessary, however, the mere presence of these actors in
the regulatory field is not sufficient to explain why this loose and complex
regulatory system seems to be effectuating changed standards. That remains in
important part a mystery. The FSC and PEFC have strikingly little coercive
power (although they do have some), and the diverse interests of states and
businesses would seem to pull in all kinds of directions. The next Section
28 Periodically, there are also new entrants to regulatory fields as organizations seek to extend their
reach. Recently, for example, the International Organization for Standardization ("ISO") has
undertaken an effort to set standards for corporate social responsibility programs as a whole. Its
Committee on Consumer Policy has developed draft standard ISO 26000, which is expected to be
published in 2010. Guidance on Social Rerponsibili , ISO/TMB/WG SR N55, OSO/WD 26000,
(March 28, 2006), available online at <http://inni.pacinst.org/inni/corporatesocial_
responsibility/N055WD1_26000.pdf> (visited Nov 17, 2007). Such developments often create
challenges for the other standard-setting organizations. To protect themselves, they also form
various kinds of alliances, such as ISEAL (as discussed in note 16).
29 Forest Stewardship Council, available online at <http://www.fsc.org/en/> (visited Nov 17,
2007).
30 Programme for Endorsement of Forest Certification, available online at <http://www.pefc.org/
internet/html/> (visited Nov 17, 2007).
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explores the proposition that the System works in part because it lays claim to a
kind of democratic legitimacy.
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111. D I1OCRATI( GoVERNANCE AND COMPETITIVi
SUPRAGOVERN\MLNTAL RILGULATION
Assuining the above depiction of competitive supragovernmental
regulator\ systems is reasonably accurate, how can it be that they actually
govern? They have little coercive power, and most of the coercive power that
they do hold could be deployed in opposing directions by different participants.
If, therefore, they govern more through authority than through power, what
might be the source of that authority? Not custom, rchgion, or tradition, since
these are diverse, inconsistently distributed, and often under pressure. That
leaves expertise, collective survival, and democracy as likely candidates.
S'Ixpertisc explains little, as it is present in all of the programs. If each program
has it, wiy would we need several? Collective survival may help answer that
question, since competing groups of experts may increase the likelihood of
generating effective societal policies. However, man of the regulatory domains
with competitive supragovernmental regulatory systems are hard to describe as
closely connected to collective survival. But their respective domains do involve
issues that many people think arc important and require regulation. Thus,
democratic responsiveness and legitimacy may indeed be an important part of
the puzzle. The problem is that if these competitive supragovernmental
,/ ciding , 1 aIltl Vl (,ore'iance at 263 (cited in note 23).
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regulatory systems further democracy, they do so in ways that do not fit very
comfortably with received models of democracy.
Since the argument in this Article is based on extrapolations from empirical
research, it is not necessary to offer an extended treatment of democratic theory.
However, it is helpful to frame the discussion in relation to conventional
concepts of democracy that are broadly held. Built out of "demos" (the people)
and "kratia" (power, rule), the term is often literally rendered as "rule by the
people. ' 3 2 This immediately raises the questions, who are "the people" in
competitive supragovernmental regulatory systems, and how do they "rule"? For
several centuries, conventional answers have tended to assume that states and
their subunits appropriately delimit "the people" and have focused debate on
methods of rule, largely dividing between "aggregative" and "deliberative"
visions on the one hand, and "direct" and "representative" models on the other,
and then combining them in various ways.33 Typically, the main mode of
democratic rule is law. Thus, in aggregative models, the people either simply
vote on their laws or vote for representatives who then vote on laws. In
deliberative models, the people either reason together to develop the best laws,
or their representatives do so. Thus, a representative system can have both
aggregative and deliberative elements, as can a direct system.
As noted in Section II, all of the procedural devices and institutional
practices of aggregative and deliberative democracy exist within individual
supragovernmental regulatory programs. The FSC is one of the most elaborate
examples, with a global "general assembly" made up of economic,
environmental, and social chambers, each with equal voting power, and each
subdivided into "northern" and "southern" subchambers, also with equal voting
power (regardless of membership numbers) .3 New statutes and policies require
a two-thirds vote35 and, thus, substantial agreement across the chambers and
subchambers. Most rules and standards are developed through extensive
deliberative proceedings involving consultation, formal public notice and
comment processes, and public explanations of decisions.36 Certifications of
companies are also publicized along with written summaries of the facts found
and decisions made.
32 See, for example, Robert Dahl, Democragy and Its Cntics 3 (Yale 1989).
33 Joshua Cohen and Charles Sabel, Directyl-Deiberafive PoLyarchy, 3 Eur LJ 313 (1997).
34 FSC, Forest Stewardship Coundl AC By-Laws, bylaws 12 & 13, available online at
<http://www.fsc.org/keepout/en/content-areas/77/84/files/1_lFSC-By-Laws-2006.pdf>
(visited Nov 17, 2007).
35 Id at bylaw 15.
36 Meidinger, 17 EurJ Intl L at 67 (cited in note 15).
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The FSC thus implements both representative and deliberative democratic
structures and procedures. Other supragovernmental regulatory programs are
moving in similar directions, although few are as elaborate in both their
representational and deliberative aspects.37  But does that make them
"democratic" governance mechanisms?
This question returns us to that of who "the people" are. The
supragovernmental regulatory programs under discussion are nominally
voluntary; their standards apply only to those who choose to conform to them.
Thus, in one sense they appear to be clearly democratic. The people who are
ruled choose to subject themselves to the rules. It is as if they purposely locate
themselves in a polity whose laws are to their liking. And if they become
disenchanted with the laws they can leave that polity simply by leaving the
program.
There are two preliminary problems with this depiction, the first involving
formal citizenship and the second practical power. Regarding citizenship, the
"subjects" of the rules do not always have the capacity to help choose the rules.
In some programs, firms that are certified are not allowed to be members of the
standard setting organization, although they generally have the opportunity to
comment on proposed rules.38 In other programs, many choose not to be
members even though they could be. Thus, it would seem that some people are
making rules for others. Yet this does not appear to be a major problem on first
consideration because the subjects have the right to exit the polity if they so
choose, allowing them an effective veto over the rules that could apply to
them."
37 Id at 68.
38 A prominent example is the industry sponsored Sustainable Forestry Initiative ("SFI") in the US.
Membership in the parent organization, the American Forest & Paper Association ("AF&PA"), is
limited to approximately two-hundred of the largest companies in the country. SFI has no
members at all and is constituted entirely by an eighteen-member Board of Directors (with a
current actual membership of fifteen) originally established by the AF&PA predecessor
organization. See Sustainable Forestry Initiative, Bylaws of the Sustainable Forestry Initiative, Inc,
available online at <http://www.sfiprogram.org/miscPDFs/SFIIncBylaws.pdf > (visited Nov 17,
2007).
39 For a somewhat parallel argument about regulating the global garment industry, see Terry
Macdonald and Kate Macdonald, Non-Electoral Accountabiliy in Global Politics: Strengthening
Democratic Control within the Global Garment Industry, 17 Eur J Intl L 119 (2006). My more
individualistic analysis echoes Albert Hirschman, who held that too-easy exit could be bad for an
organization because those dissatisfied with organizational practices would choose simply to exit
rather than to voice their concerns and seek change, leaving the organization effectively unable to
adapt. See Albert 0. Hirschman, Exit, Voice, and Loyaly: Responses to Decline in Firms, OqaniZations,
and States 37 (Harvard 1970). The focus on information gathering and attentiveness fostered by
supragovernmental regulatory competition, of course, may provide a partial remedy for this
problem.
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Easy exit, however, is often seriously constrained by practical power. Many
firms choose to subject themselves to supragovernmental regulatory standards
not so much because they wish to live under them as because they feel that they
must in order to avoid significant economic losses. They believe this because
activist groups threaten to associate their brands with such bad practices as
destroying rainforests, abusing workers, annihilating fisheries, and supporting
civil conflict.40 The FSC, for example, enjoyed major uptake as a result of
hundreds of protest actions over several years by the Rainforest Action Network
at Home Depot stores in North America. Once Home Depot agreed to favor
FSC products in its purchasing policies, its enormous market power leveraged
the FSC system into place among large numbers of producers in (or wanting to
be in) Home Depot's market chain.41 Other big retailers (Lowes, B&Q, Obi) did
the same thing in both North America and Europe, thus cumulatively leveraging
the FSC regulatory system into place in a substantial portion of the forestry
sector.
42
What does the role of economic coercion in driving supragovernmental
regulation mean for its claim to democratic legitimacy? The first critique is easy
to see: a few "green" or "socially progressive" activist groups are imposing
regulatory standards that suit their values-"blackmailing" businesses, as is
sometimes said.43 But what is the basis of the blackmail? What is the nature of
the threat? The "weapon" that activists are exercising is the threat to publicize
their claim that challenged practices fall below socially acceptable standards. In
the cases considered in this Article, the standards at issue have been articulated
and publicized through the formal rulemaking processes of supragovernmental
regulatory programs.' The implicit claim is that the standards reflect public
values (implicitly values of "the people") to which businesses should be held
accountable and thus constitute public duties. Hence, any punishment suffered
by firms results from their failure to meet their social obligations, rather than
violation of their rights.
The question of exactly what public values (or whose) are at issue is
sharpened by a second version of the unequal power critique. This is the
40 See generally, for example, Michael Conroy, Branded (New Society 2007).
41 Sasser, Gaining Leverage at 231 (cited in note 11).
42 Cashore, Auld, and Newsom, 5 Bus & Pol at 241 (cited in note 21); Meidinger, Multi-Interest Sef-
Governance at 263 (cited in note 23).
43 See ForestNewsWatch, Leadership Interview with Patrick Moore, Part 1, (Aug 8, 2004), available online
at <http://www.forestnewswatch.com/content/view/543/79/> (visited Nov 17, 2007).
44 This contrasts to the largely one-off nature of the local negotiations of the "social license" as
discussed in Neil Gunningham, Robert Kagan, and Dorothy Thornton, Shades of Green: Business,
Regulation, and the Environment (Stanford 2003).
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argument that supragovernmental regulatory programs are essentially a system of
developed country imperialism: activists from wealthy countries threaten to get
their consumers to boycott commodities produced in ways that do not meet
their standards, thus forcing producers in developing countries to conform to
developed country standards.45 Indeed, producers in developing countries often
say that they are complying with supragovernmental regulatory standards
because European or American activists and consumers demand that they do
so,46 suggesting that they are subjects and not citizens of the regulatory
programs.
The imperialism critique is probably the most probing test of the
democratic claims of competitive supragovernmental regulatory programs. The
strongest response that can be made on their behalf includes the following
elements:
Broad Representalion. As already noted, most supragovernmental regulatory
programs embrace the norm of broad participation. Moreover, the emerging
international standard is quite inclusive; an "interested party" with a legitimate
right to participate is anyone "concerned with or directly affected by" a given
standard.47 While some programs-typically industry-based-carefully control
which stakeholders participate, and at what stages, they generally feel a need to
incorporate at least the major kinds of interests involved in their regulatory
fields.48 It remains to be seen how well these "house environmentalists and
social justice representatives" can be managed over time. Moreover, competition
among programs includes public criticism of exclusionary and manipulated
participation structures. 49  Beyond simply allowing interested parties to
45 These concerns are well-summarized in Arthur E. Appleton, Environmental Labelling Schemes
Revisited: WTO Law and Developing County Implications, in Gary P. Sampson and W. Bradnee
Chambers, eds, Trade, Environment and the Millennium 236, 240-43 (2002) (noting that developing
countries often see the eco-labeling standards as difficult to meet, difficult to influence, hard to
learn about, and inappropriate to developing country conditions).
46 For example, see the following articles, all in Benjamin Cashore, Fred Gale, Errol Meidinger, and
Deanna Newsom, eds, Confronting Sustainabilio: Forest Ceriification in Developing and Transitioning
Counties (Yale School of Forestry & Envir Stud 2006): Dwi Rahmad Muhtaman and Ferdinandus
Agung Prasetyo, Forest Certificalion in Indonesia 33, 35; Maria Tysiachniouk, Forest Certification in
Russia 261, 288; Lincoln Quevedo, Forest Certification in Bolivia 303, 313-14, 326; Peter May, Forest
Certification in Bra#l 337, 339; Felix Njovu, Forest Certificaion in Zambia 535, 546-47.
47 ISEAL Code at 3.2 (cited in note 16). Perhaps reflecting the broadening definition of the
concept, ISEAL uses the term "interested party" rather than stakeholder. This is also the practice
in ISO environmental standard setting. International Organization for Standardization,
International Standard ISO 14001, § 3.11 (1996).
48 As evidenced in the SFI's decision to include economic, environmental and social/community
interests on their Board of Directors. Sustainable Forestry Initiative, Bylaws at 2 (cited in note 38).
49 See, for example, Simon Counsell and Kim Terje Loraas, Trading in Credibility: The Myth and Reality
of the Forest Stewardship Coundl 30-34 (Rainforest Found UK), available online at
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participate, leading programs such as the FSC make efforts to provide resources
and venues enabling poor and underrepresented interests to participate in their
deliberative processes. Even in the best circumstances, however, this is still a
notional concept of participation. Representatives are not chosen by
constituents. Rather, people with given types of interests are assumed to be able
to represent them for others. While there are deep ontological issues with this
concept of representation, as a practical matter it often does not seem
unreasonable to those involved in regulatory arenas.
Nonetheless, every supragovernmental regulatory program appears
somewhat partial in its representation. Each one can be characterized as
attracting certain types of businesses, activists, professionals, and so on, and not
others. Thus, the industry-sponsored programs are easily (and usually accurately)
characterized as leaning toward industry viewpoints. 0 Conversely, programs
sponsored by activist groups can be characterized as leaning toward their
viewpoints."' No program can be said to represent "the public" fully, no matter
how broad-based or open it might be. A fundamental reason is that it is not clear
which public is to be represented. The focus of most supragovernmental
regulatory programs is increasingly transnational, often global. Their operative
assumption is that standards and implementation mechanisms should be
appropriate across local, national, and regional borders, and ideally around the
globe. Yet the communities involved are both plural and partial. They are plural
in the sense that local, state, and transnational peoples, including geographic
communities, tribes, activist groups, consumer associations, interest networks,
trading groups, and industrial sectors are all implicated. A few are organized as
polities, but most are not. Moreover, the development of transnational
communities is partial and incomplete. Many of them grow up around trade and
<http://www.rainforestfoundationuk.org/files/Trading%2in%2Credibility /o2full%20
report.pdf> (visited Nov 17, 2007); Saskia Ozinga, Behind the Logo: An Environmental and Sodal
Assessment of Forest Certification Schemes (FERN 2001), available online at
<http://www.fern.org/pubs/reports/behind/bdpage.html> (visited Nov 17, 2007); Jim
Motavalli and Brian C. Howard, Commentary, Sustainable Forestry . . . With a Chainsaw?,
emagazine.com (May/June 2005), available online at <http://www.emagazine.com/view/?2530>
(visited Nov 17, 2007); Data O'Rourke, Multi-Stakeholder Regulation: Privating or Sodalizng Global
Labor Standards?, 34 World Dev 899, 902 (2006); Jeremy Weber, Fair Trade Coffee Enthusiasts Should
Confront Realiy, 27 Cato J 109 (2007).
50 See, for example, O'Rourke, Multi-Stakeholder Regulation at 903 (cited in note 49); Lars H.
Gulbrandsen, Accountabiliy Arrangements in Transnational Standards Organizations Instrumental Design
and Imitation, Paper prepared for the Amsterdam Conference on the Human Dimensions of
Global Environmental Changes 19 (May 24-26, 2007), available online at <http://www.2007
amsterdamconference.org/Downloads/AC2007_Gulbrandsen.pdf> (visited Nov 17, 2007).
5' See, for example, Matt Bennett, FSC Not Top Choice,' Wrong Choice for Lowe's, Envir News (Sept 1,




Chicago Journal of International Law
are linked and organized through economic sectors; a few (for example,
indigenous peoples and social justice activists) are linked through common
interests and rapidly improving communications networks. But these are all
communities under construction. Most transnational peoples are at best
emergent and highly changeable. Obviously, then, there is no unifying global
polity to define the appropriate scope of representation. Nor are there organized
public choice mechanisms capable of marshalling the will of transnational
communities and translating it into policy.
Accountability to Governments. An important, although recently muted,
response to the paradox of transnational representation is that
supragovernmental regulatory programs are accountable to states in multiple
ways. Indeed, as noted above and discussed in more detail elsewhere,53 most
supragovernmental programs have been careful to accommodate existing state
laws and policies and to anticipate future ones where possible. Moreover, states
stand in the wings with the capacity to regulate both the supragovernmental
programs themselves and the activities within state territories that are the object
of the supragovernmental programs. Again, however, this capacity is limited by
economic coercion to the degree that transnational trade may be threatened by a
state's refusal to accommodate supragovernmental regulatory policies, as well as
by the simple costs and difficulties of mounting or modifying a regulatory
program. Thus, although state policies stand as constraints on
supragovernmental ones, they work more as influences than as controls.
There is also an equally powerful obverse reason why state constraints are
not an adequate answer to the imperialism critique: states have few institutional
incentives to consider the effects of their policies on noncitizens outside their
boundaries. Thus, even where state policies can be seen as democratically
legitimate vis-a-vis domestic constituencies, they may be imperialistic as to
noncitizens when state regulatory policies are powerful enough to influence
extraterritorial behavior or have other extraterritorial effects.5 4 In this sense,
supragovernmental rulemaking processes that are open to whoever wishes to
participate may have some democratic advantages over state-based ones.
52 Thus, fragmented decision structures of the kind that Professor Aman worries about are as
widespread in the supragovernmental regulatory system as in state-centered ones. See Alfred C.
Aman, The Democragy Defcit: Taming Globa/ ation through Law Reform 177 (NYU 2004).
53 Meidinger, Mui-Interest Self-Governance at 272-283 (cited in note 23).
54 The US Department of Agriculture's requirements for organic certification, for example, have
powerful effects on Mexican farmers who depend on access to the US organic market. See, for
example, Brady, Tighter Organic Standards May Squeeze Out Small Farmers, (Apr 4, 2007), available
online at <http://twohandsworldshop.com/blog/2007/04/04/tighter-organic-standards-may-
sqeeze-out-small-farmers/> (visited Nov 17, 2007).
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Robust Deliberaive Processes. Deliberative democracy is sometimes seen as a
way of circumventing the problems of representation and aggregation."5
Deliberative processes have received a great deal of attention in virtually all
supragovernmental regulatory programs. While some are considerably more
serious and advanced than others, they have shown a broad movement toward
the hallmarks of modern deliberative regulation, including structured,
deliberative procedures, public rights to comment on proposed rules, emphasis
on empirical accuracy, and acceptance of transparency. Although there are many
strains of deliberative democratic theory, some far more stringent than others,
their shared criteria include:
" fair and open decisional procedures;
" arguments based on reasons;
* policy and law based on the best combination of facts and analysis,
including consideration for the concerns of all; and
* policy monitoring and learning. 6
The last criterion deserves elaboration. Supragovernmental regulatory
programs have the possibility of testing and revising the results of their
deliberations, since they involve on-the-ground practices that in principle are to
be evaluated for results. As with most, if not all, regulatory programs, the actual
amount of monitoring often falls short of expectations, in part because it
involves continuing costs and in part because resources are regularly drawn to
fresh battles. Nonetheless, much monitoring does occur. More importantly, the
competition between programs creates continual pressures for auditing. In many
cases, programs track their competitors with the intention of publicizing their
shortcomings. 7 The resulting contention sometimes generates new measures
and methods, such as the use of GPS data to measure actual environmental
effects, demands for improved recordkeeping, and independent testing of
environmental and social conditions. In sum, competitive supragovernmental
regulatory systems have built-in incentives both to deliberate carefully and to
measure results and revise standards and methods accordingly.
55 Cohen and Sabel, 3 Eur L J at 320 (cited in note 33). See Jiurgen Habermas, Between Facts and
Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Tbeoy of Law and Democray 290-328 (MIT 1996).
56 See, for example, Habermas, Between Facts and Norms at 296 (cited in note 55). These propositions
are accepted in principle by all supragovernmental regulatory programs of which I am aware.
57 See, for example, the PEFC-supported tract (PEFC was the Pan-European Forest Certification
Council before it went global in 2003) by Hannes Mintyranta, Forest Certification: An Ideal that
Became an Absolute (Meetsilehti Kustannus 2002).
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Adoplion of Widey Accepted Norms. The account of democratic practices thus
far could be construed as entirely procedural, and therefore lacking substantive
rationality.18 But in fact supragovernmental regulatory practices share substantive
patterns as well, and much can be learned from how supragovernmental
regulators choose substantive policies. Since programs are deeply imitative
institutionally, it is not surprising that they are also prone to be deeply
assimilative substantively. Virtually all supragovernmental regulatory standard
setting processes absorb principles, standards, criteria, and indicators (indeed,
these have become standard terms of art in the field) that have already been
developed in other forums and then refine them for practical application. Most
supragovernmental regulatory standards and rules brim with principles and
standards borrowed from other processes and organizations. Often they are
forms of soft law previously developed by national or international processes. In
the environmental domain, for example, they typically include sustainability,
human rights, labor, biodiversity, and pollution standards borrowed from many
sources, including international treaties, conventions, protocols, agreements in
principle, United Nations organizations, national laws, and academic and
professional associations. 9
Why do supragovernmental regulatory programs do so much substantive
borrowing, and what are the implications of this practice? The primary answer to
the first question is relatively clear: they want their programs to be accepted and
58 Wolf Heydebrand, Process Rationalioy as Legal Governance: A Conparaive Perspective, 18 Intl Sociology
325, 331 (2003).
59 There are a great many examples of this pattern, including forest certification as discussed thus
far. Most of the FSC's Principles and Criteria, for example, are built out of international standards
and discussions of various kinds, although those connections are often not explicit and have not
been pursued in any detailed research of which I am aware. When it was founded, the PEFC
explicitly claimed to have built its standards on a series of intergovernmental processes extending
back the "Helsinki process" which involved a series of ministerial and high level staff conferences
on the protection of forests in Europe. See Pan-European Criteria and Indicators for Sustainable Forest
Management, Resolution L2, Annex 1, available online at <http://www.pefc.org/internet/
resources/4_1334_702_file.614.pdf> (visited Nov 17, 2007) (developed for the Third Ministerial
Conference on the Protection of Forests in Europe (une 2-4, 1998)). Since going global the
PEFC has downplayed these origins, but they are still visible in the structure and content of its
program. In cases of labor standards the connections are even closer, as is exemplified by the
prominence of International Labor Organization ("ILO") standards in Social Accountability
International, SA 8000 Standard, available online at <http://www.sa-intl.org/index.cfm?
fuseaction=Page.viewPage&pagelD=710> (visited Nov 17, 2007). One arguable exception to this
pattern is the current International Federation of Organic Agriculture Movements ("IFOAM")
standard-setting process, which seems to be trying to articulate meta-principles. But even this
effort is framed in terms of capturing the essence of the organic foods movement to date and
stating it at a higher level of insight and generality. IFOAM, The Prindples of Oqanic Agriculture,
available online at <http://www.ifoam.org/about-ifoam/principles/index.htrnl> (visited Nov
17,2007).
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to be viewed as legitimate. As one interviewee succinctly put it, "[o]ur effort is to
constantly create greater resonance with a greater raft of stakeholders. To be
successful, we must produce a standard that resonates with what people want
and hopefully what other people will want in the future."6 ° Of course, choices
must be made regarding which standards to adopt, where to modify them, how
to implement them, and so on. And on these issues, programs usually differ
significantly at the outset, mainly regarding the industry versus NGO
orientations noted above and then commence the competitive adjustments and
partial convergences also discussed above.
Competition for Public Acceptance. This competitive element points to what
may be the hidden democratic genius of competitive supragovernmental
regulation. In competing for acceptance in the complex arena of industry, NGO,
state, and public observation, supragovernmental regulatory programs are under
continual pressure to develop programs that will both work on the ground and
prove acceptable to the various "publics" that they seek to win over. This may
foster more democratic responsiveness than is traditionally the case with state
regulatory agencies, which enjoy greater levels of regulatory monopoly and
therefore can occasionally be much less responsive.
Antidpatoy Orientation. Moreover, there are interesting analogies to the
literature on prediction markets, which some economists and psychologists
argue can be much more effective at pooling and analyzing information than
traditional deliberative processes.61 This is in part because prediction markets
involve devoting valuable resources to deliberations and carry the possibility of
rewards or losses depending on the quality of the predictions.
Supragovernmental regulatory programs seem to face similar incentives. They
must obtain resources to establish themselves and must continue to generate
resources to survive. Thus, they develop standards and regulatory programs with
a keen eye to public acceptability, implementability, and so on, because their
economic viability depends on it. They must persuade potential customers and
constituents that they "add value" to survive.
The challenges facing supragovernmental regulatory programs seem greater
than those facing traditional prediction markets, which generally focus on factual
issues such as outcomes of presidential elections, demand for gasoline, and the
like. Supragovernmental regulatory programs are engaged in predicting clearly
60 Interview 50703 (on file with author).
61 See, for example, Justin Wolfers and Eric Zitzewitz, Prediction Markets, 18 J Econ Perspectives 107
(2004). For an added argument about the inherent shortcomings of deliberative groups, see Cass
R. Sunstein, Deliberating Groups versus Prediction Markets (or Haek's Challenge to Habermas),
Episteme - (forthcoming), available online at <http://ssm.com/abstract-id=956189>
(visited Nov 17, 2007).
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normative issues, such as what levels of environmental protection or worker
protection will be socially desirable. Moreover, it must be acknowledged that
they often may hope to influence those standards, both by participating in the
debate about what the standards should require and by demonstrating how
effectively they can be implemented.
It is also plausible that in trying to articulate workable and publicly
acceptable regulatory standards, supragovernmental regulatory programs provide
valuable predictability regarding the requirements of the "social license" to
which many businesses believe they must conform, but about whose content
they are often unsure.62 By seeking to set broadly acceptable standards, programs
can remove some of the process of defining social licenses from individual
negotiations between companies and local communities to a more general and
predictable footing.
On a theoretical level, then, it is possible to see competitive
supragovernmental regulatory systems as quite promising. Their competitive,
future-oriented dynamics offer one approach to constructing a functional kind
of "anticipatory democracy" well beyond the mix of future oriented expertise
and participation that Toffler envisioned.63 Indeed, they do not even wither
before the Rawlsian standard of defining rules that people would accept if they
did not know their station in life or when they might live.64 They also address
Steffek's related but somewhat less stringent requirement that generating rules to
which everyone in principle can agree is a necessary condition of achieving
legitimacy.6" These systems have the additional benefit of responding to the
prospect that concepts of just behavior are likely to be a moving standard. If
anticipatory competition indeed characterizes supragovernmental regulatory
systems, it increases the likelihood that they may offer a tenable answer to the
imperialism problem discussed. This is mainly because programs have long term
incentives to develop regulatory arrangements that are acceptable to the widest
available audiences, thus spanning extended transnational market chains.
Moreover, these incentives include the need to anticipate changes in market
power, which may occur as developing countries organize more effectively to
maximize the value of their resources. Overall, then, it could turn out that
62 Neil Gunningham, Robert A. Kagan, and Dorothy Thornton, Social License and Environmental
Protection: Why Businesses Go Beyond Compliance, 29 L & Soc Inquiry 307 (2004).
63 Toffler, 9 Futurist at 225 (cited in note 1); Clement Bezold, ed, Antidipato Democraty: People in the
Politics of the Future (Random House 1978).
64 John Rawls, A Theory ofJustice 136 (Harvard 1971).
65 Jens Steffek, The Legitimation of International Governance: A Discourse Approach, 9 Eur J Intl Rel 249,
265 (2003).
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competitive supragovernmental regulatory systems are valuable vehicles for
democratizing regulation across national boundaries and over time.
IV. CONCLUSION
A. RECAPPING THE BRIGHT SIDE
Looked at cumulatively and relatively optimistically, competitive
supragovernmental regulation holds considerable democratic promise. First, as
discussed above, the leading NGO programs are quite participatory and
inclusive, and seem to be growing more so. To compete, many industry
programs have also begun to stress the importance of multi-stakeholder groups.
Second, the leading programs tend to be quite elaborate procedurally and do
well when measured against practical criteria of deliberative democracy. Their
policymaking processes follow extensive procedures for discussion and debate,
and results are generally supported with detailed arguments and analyses. In each
of these regards, supragovernmental programs compare reasonably well to state
programs. Third, the applied and competitive nature of the regulatory field
means that these programs are likely to engage in a kind of democratic
experimentalism, in which regulatory policies are developed, implemented,
criticized, competed with, and revised through the processes described above.
Fourth, their heavy use of already developed norms, principles, and standards
suggests that they are firmly connected to broader norm development processes,
both governmental and supragovernmental, and actively seek areas of
overlapping consensus which can be developed and implemented. Fifth, their
incentives are such that these programs may be the best mechanisms we have of
trying to define regulatory standards that will receive wide acceptance by a broad
diversity of actors in very different social circumstances over time. All in all, this
could turn out to be a promising path toward greater transnational democracy.
B. PONDERING THE DARK SIDE
This Article extrapolates from existing empirical research to construct an
account of how regulatory governance processes that are typically seen as
suffering significant democratic shortcomings could in fact be sketching out a
new form of transnational democracy. But there are many possible problems
with this portrayal and hence potentially with the processes described above.
At the empirical level, we still have very limited information on how
participation actually works in supragovernmental regulatory programs. While
the FSC has been fairly well studied, most other programs have not. And even
the FSC has knowledgeable critics who challenge the legitimacy and
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effectiveness of its programs.66 Similarly, we have little evidence that democratic
experimentalism is actually being practiced on a widespread basis. It is possible
that what we often have is a form of managed tokenism designed to cloak status
quo practices in a mantle of procedural and technocratic propriety. The same
questions apply to whether we have abundant information flows, truly
competitive monitoring, and accountable decisionmaking." Third, while this
Article has assumed that the systems described are actually effectuating
governance, the evidence to support this assumption is actually rather thin.
Where social and environmental problems steadily outpace solutions, as they do
in most supragovernmental regulatory arenas, it is quite possible to see the
governance situation as one of great fragmentation combined with diffuse and
obscure effects. While this may be because we have few good empirical methods
for actually measuring the effectiveness of governance institutions, the problem
needs to be addressed.
Perhaps most importantly, although this Article describes the competitive
processes driving supragovernmental regulatory programs, we know very little
about how the outcomes of these competitions are being determined. It would
be encouraging if regulatory programs gravitate toward policies that are
acceptable to the broadest possible range of people moving into the future, and,
thereby, consistently promote democratization. But we really do not know if that
is happening, or if other less admirable interests are determining outcomes. It is
clear, however, that we need to begin discussing what the rules of the
competition should be, and in particular what rules would have to be put into
place to foster the kinds of democratic outcomes that seem possible for this
emerging mode of regulatory governance. This will require better empirical
research on the determinants regulatory competitions. That in hand, we may be
able to revise the relevant rules to help push competitive supragovernmental
regulatory systems toward their full democratic potential.
66 See Counsel and Loraas, Trading in Credibiliy at 30-34 (cited in note 49).
67 See Christine Parker, The Open Corporation: Effective Self-Regulation and Democray 245-91 (Cambridge
2002) (analyzing this problem in corporate self-regulation).
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